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Police often confront situations in which they wish to gain custody
of one suspected of a serious crime, but under circumstances where
the probability of guilt is not adequate to justify an arrest for the
suspected offense. Usually the desire to obtain custody is bottomed
on a felt need to interrogate the suspect under circumstances viewed
as favorable to obtaining admissions of complicity, or on a fear that
the suspect will flee the jurisdiction or otherwise seek to prevent
discovery of his whereabouts.'
The comprehensive-indeed vague-wording of modern vagrancy
statutes, coupled with the amorphous nature of the crime at common
law, provides law enforcement agencies with a flexible tool to carry
out this purpose. Commonly, arrests on a charge of vagrancy are
made without intention to carry through prosecution for that offense,
but solely to obtain custody of one suspected of a more serious offense.
The use of vagrancy statutes to accomplish purposes other than
prosecution for vagrancy constitutes the subject matter of this note.2
1. See United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951), where Justice
Douglas said,
Another time-honored police method for obtaining confessions is to arrest
a man on one charge (often a minor one) and use his detention for investi-
gating a wholly different crime. This is an easy short-cut for the police.
How convenient it is to make detention the vehicle of investigation! Then
the police can have access to the prisoner day and night. Arraignment for
one crime gives some protection. But when it is a pretense or used as the
device for breaking the will of the prisoner on long, relentless, or repeated
questionings, it is abhorrent. We should free the federal system of that
disreputable practice which has honeycombed the municipal police system
in this country. We should make illegal such a perversion of a "legal" deten-
tion.
Here the court held that the defendant's murder confession was not inad-
missible solely because it was given prior to his arrest for that charge.
2. Vagrancy statutes have been used:
A. To harass reputed criminals. Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to
Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345, 369 (1936); Lacey,
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203,
1218 (1953); Note, 16 St. Louis L. Rev. 148, 153 (1931).
B. To serve as a cloak to justify an arrest that could not be legally made.
Freund, The Police Power § 100 (1904); Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 614 (1956).
C. To arrest on suspicion (arrests on suspicion are illegal). See generally,
Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1, 13 (1960).
D. To arrest for investigation. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The principal discussion will be preceded by an analysis of the purpose
and function of vagrancy statutes as a background to the problem.,
I. NATURE AND PURPOSE OF VAGRANCY LAWS
The purpose of vagrancy laws is the prevention of crime.4  At
common law a vagrant was one who was idle, without visible means
(1961), wherein the defendant was arrested on a breach of the peace charge
so that the police might interrogate him concerning a recent killing in that
area. The court commented on this by saying that the breach of the peace
charge was a palpable ruse concocted to give the police time to pursue their
investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36 (1951);
Freund, op. cit. supra; Douglas, supra at 12; Foote, supra at 614; Hall,
supra at 369; Lacey, supra at 1218; Ploscowe, A Modern Law of Arrest,
39 Minn. L. Rev. 472 (1955); Note, 59 Yale L.J. 1351 (1950).
E. To round up a certain class of known criminals, such as prostitutes.
Douglas, supra at 8.
F. To imprison possible suicides and mentally ill. Foote, supra at 615.
(While this is a necessary humanitarian service, it is nevertheless an abuse
of the criminal process.)
G. To validate what would otherwise be an illegal search. Ibid.
3. Although beyond the scope of this note, it is noteworthy that courts often
attempt to retain custody of suspects by setting bail for minor offenses at un-
conscionable amounts. Such procedure is not pursuant to the primary purpose of
bail, which is to insure the presence of the accused at trial. U.S. Const. amend.
VIII. The motive in these high bail cases, clearly, is to hold the accused for
interrogation or investigation. See People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 Il1.
464, 173 N.E. 8 (1980), where a suspect with a long criminal record was arrested
and charged with vagrancy and three other crimes. Bail on the vagrancy count
was set at $10,000, but when the court discovered that such amount could be
posted by the suspect, the judge increased the bail to $50,000, stating that if he
thought the accused could post this amount he would increase it. The supreme
court held such bond unreasonable and excessive. See also Ex parte Lonardo,
86 Ohio App. 289, 89 N.E.2d 502 (1949), where petitioner with a criminal record
was suspected of membership in an organized band of law breakers then under
investigation. After being arrested for violating a city ordinance and charged as
a suspicious person, he appealed the bail, set at $75,000. The appellate court, in
ordering a reduction of the bond, said,
We are aware of the difficulties encountered by public officials in the investi-
gation and prosecution of crime. Also, we recognize the worthy motives that
impel conscientious law enforcement officers to ask for high bail on minor
charges against persons suspected of committing major crimes. But such
consideration must yield to the imperious voice of the Constitution which
the courts are sworn to support .... If, by adhering to the constitutional
mandate, as we must, an advantage accrues to those who deserve it least,
such a result is to be deplored. But greater potentialities for enduring
harm lie in an evasion of judicial duty that would impair the integrity
of one of the fundamental guarantees of liberty contained in the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 290-93, 89 N.E.2d at 503-04.
4. Lacey, supra note 2. See People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301
(1984); Forbes' Case, 11 Abb. Pr. 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860); State v. Grenz, 26
Wash. 2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946).
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of support, and who, although able to work, refused to do so.5 State
statutory vagrancy provisions6 have been enlarged so as to encompass
not only the sweeping coverage of the common law definition of the
crime,7 but also such specific acts as: abandoning wife or child;"
begging;9 disorderly conduct in a public place;10 fortune telling;"
gambling; 12 lewdness; 13 masquerading with intent to conceal one's
identity ;14 operating a confidence game;15 thieving ;26 wandering about
the streets at a late or unusual hour ;17 overcharging, 8 and other
specific acts detrimental to society.' 9
When attacked as vague or indefinite, vagrancy statutes consis-
tently have been held constitutional as not violative of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, 0 or as a valid exercise of the
police power of the state for the preservation of community good
order and security.2 One accused of vagrancy usually is not entitled
to a trial by jury, for this constitutional guarantee22 is not made ap-
plicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 23 The constitution secures the right to trial by jury only
for those offenses which were so entitled at the time of its adoption.2 4
5. Foote, supra note 2 at 615-17.
6. For a comprehensive list of the vagrancy statutes, and scope, see Lacey,
supra note 2 at 1207 nn.17 & 18.
7. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1141(1) (1951).
8. State v. Chapman, 202 S.W. 439 (Mo. App. 1918).
9. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 856.02 (1941); Ga. Code Ann. § 26-7001 (1953).
10. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 45, § 11 (1) (1956).
11. State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 Pac. 939 (1912).
12. E.g., Cannon v. State, 114 Ark. 263, 169 S.W. 812 (1914) ; Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21, § 1141(5) (1951).
13. R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 45, § 11(1) 1956).
14. See People v. Luechini, 75 Misc. 614, 136 N.Y.S. 319 (1912).
15. Cal. Pen. Code § 647 (4).
16. People v. O'Keefe, 178 Ill. App. 86 (1913).
17. Cal. Pen. Code § 647 (4).
18. State v. Suman, 216 Minn. 293, 12 N.W.2d 620 (1943).
19. Ibid.
20. In re McCue, 7 Cal. App. 765, 96 Pac. 110 (1908), held that the con-
stitutional right of due process would not be given precedence over supervening
considerations of public policy.
21. City of New Orleans v. Postek, 180 La. 1048, 158 So. 553 (1935). See also
Levine v. State, 110 N.J.L. 467, 166 Atl. 300 (1933), where a vagrancy statute
was attacked as class legislation because of the specification of certain classes as
vagrants.
22. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
24. Ragsdale v. City of Danville, 116 Va. 484, 82 S.E. 77 (1914). See also,
Ex parte Clancy, 112 Kan. 247, 210 Pac. 487 (1922); People v. Harding, 115 Misc.
298, 189 N.Y. Supp. 657 (Erie County Ct. 1921); State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 606
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As a result, vagrancy and many other petty offenses are triable
without a jury, and a summary conviction is a conviction by due
process of law. 25
It is apparent that these statutes are readily adaptable for utiliza-
tion as effective crime preventives, for vagrancy laws, as contrasted
with the usual criminal laws, are broad regulatory measures rather
than specifically punitive in character.20 The offender of the common
law of vagrancy is guilty of being a certain type of person,2 rather
than of committing or omitting certain acts.2 8 Thus, vagrancy laws
are designed as police regulations to prevent rather than to punish
criminal acts.29 Because of this peculiar purpose, it is necessary that
vagrancy regulations be couched in equivocal, almost generic terms.2 0
As such, they may be applied, at one time or another, to any and every
citizen, law-abiding or lawless, and it is herein that the danger of their
application lurks.31 It is not the fact that vagrancy statutes are en-
forced, but the reasons for their utilization, other than for prosecution
of the crime itself, which is the concern of this note.
(1880). In this case the court said that to require jury trials for vagrants even
if practicable has never been contended; nor could such contention be maintained
for a moment.
25. Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89 (1862). Contra, Ex parte Johnson,
13 Okla. Crim. 30, 161 Pac. 1097 (1917) ; Ex parte McAlester, 13 Okla. Crim. 47,
161 Pac. 1176 (1917).
26. People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301 (1934). Here the particular
act in question was ruled invalid because it gave administrative officers arbitrary
powers.
27. Lacey, supra note 2.
28. State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946).
29. Ibid.; People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 148, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934);
Lacey, supra note 2. See also the early decision of Forbes' Case, 11 Abb. Pr. 52,
55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860) where the court held,
These statutes-declaring a certain class or description of persons vagrants,
and authorizing their conviction and punishment as such; . . .- are in fact
rather of the nature of public regulations to prevent crime and public
charges and burdens, than of the nature of ordinary criminal laws prohibit-
ing and punishing an act or acts as a crime or crimes.
30. Forbes' Case, 11 Abb. Pr. 52, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860). See also Comment,
23 Cal. L. Rev. 616, 618 (1935) where the problem of drafting an acceptable
vagrancy statute was discussed, the conclusion being that, "To create an in-
telligent and intelligible statute covering vagrancy is almost an impossibility
unless it be recognized from the beginning that a certain latitude must be
allowed in its application."
31. In Blakely v. State, 78 Ga. App. 516, 520, 51 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1949), the
court warned,
Caution should be exercised by the courts in the trial of vagrancy cases,
lest the purpose for which the statute was enacted be inadvertently extended
to law abiding citizens going about under the presumed protection of the law
in the exercise of their inherent liberties. This sacred right should be
zealously guarded by the courts and its violation never countenanced under
the guise of law enforcement.
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II. RAISING THE ISSUE
The procedural contexts in which the issue of the true purpose of
the vagrancy arrest may be raised are, in the main, two; namely, the
false arrest action and a motion to suppress illegally seized evidence.
The party arrested and ostensibly charged with vagrancy, but in-
vestigated and interrogated solely about another crime or crimes, may
choose to bring an action of false arrest against his arresting officer.
The problems of proof, however, are legion. Also, the policy deter-
mination must be made whether to hold law enforcement officers
civilly liable for arresting a notorious suspect on the only legal
grounds available. Often, if an on-the-spot arrest is not made, the
suspect will never be apprehended. Public sentiment, too, encourages
law enforcement bodies to operate without strict adherence to legal
restrictions, and the expertness of the modern criminal has virtually
forced the police to employ extralegal means to curb crimes.32 These
so-called preventive or precautionary arrests are directed toward
a legitimate end,3 3 and have been condoned when sufficiently corre-
lated with the peace, safety and welfare of the public so as to justify
the occasional inconvenience borne by the law abiding citizen.34 As
a result, it would seem to be more just and less of an intrusion upon
the effectiveness of the police power simply to suppress any evidence
obtained by, or to dismiss any charges growing out of an abuse of
the vagrancy charge, rather than to hold the arresting officer liable
in a civil action.35
A motion to suppress illegally seized evidence is another method
of questioning the propriety of an arrest on the charge of vagrancy.
In a Wisconsin case,36 defendants, suspected of burglary, were stopped
by police officers who charged them with vagrancy, questioned them
and searched their automobile. In the trunk of the auto the police
found some of the stolen articles, and so the vagrancy charge was
replaced with that of burglary. At trial, defendants objected to the
introduction of the stolen articles, the product of the search, contend-
ing that the evidence had been illegally seized. In overruling the
objection, the court held that the search was a legal incident to a
lawful arrest for vagrancy. Though the court never questioned the
purpose or motive of the initial arrest, it is apparent that the arresting
32. Cogshall, Are We Buying the Trojan Horse?, 40 J. Crim. L. & C. 242,
243 (1949); Kooken, Ethics in Police Service, 38 J. Crim. L. & C. 61 & 172
(1934); 25 J. Crim. L. & C. 279 (1934).
33. See, e.g., People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907).
34. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 187 Ore. 409, 428, 210 P.2d 577, 586 (1949).
35. Besides, the contention that the arrest is illegal seems to have been made
to no avail. See, e.g., People v. Craig, 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907).
36. Gray v. State, 243 Wis. 57, 9 N.W.2d 68 (1943).
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officers used the shield of a vagrancy charge to legitimize what would
otherwise have been an illegal search.
Had the court adhered to the guide that arrests should be made
with the intent of prosecuting to judgment the crime with which the
suspect is charged,3 7 it might well have suppressed the burglary evi-
dence seized by the arresting officers.
III. UNCONCERN OF THE JUDICIARY
The problem presented by the use and abuse of vagrancy statutes
is seldom acknowledged by American courts,3 8 which question only
whether the accused is statutorily a vagrant, and thereon judge the
legality or illegality of the arrest.3" The true motive or purpose of the
37. See Moran v. City of Beckley, 67 F.2d 161, 163 (4th Cir. 1933). In this
case the plaintiff who was arrested for driving a car with Virgina dealer license
plates through West Virginia, an act which was not unlawful, successfully
brought a false imprisonment action against the defendant who attempted to
justify the arrest on the grounds that the plaintiff was guilty of speeding. See
also Donovan v. Guy, 347 Mich. 457, 462, 80 N.W.2d 190, 192 (1956). Here the
false imprisonment action was successfully brought by the plaintiff who was
arrested for disorderly conduct, a charge of which he was not guilty, although
the court implied that the defendant might have been guilty of a parking viola-
tion.
38. Although this note purports only-to discuss the United States' view on
this subject, it is noteworthy that this problem has been recognized and condemned
by the Canadian Court as an abuse of process.
In Rex v. Dick, (1947) 2 D.L.R. 213, the plaintiff, suspected of murdering her
husband, had been retained in police custody on a vagrancy charge. During this
time, the police constantly questioned her regarding her participation in the
killing of her husband until she confessed. The court ruled that the admission
of said confession was error and set aside the conviction.
In so doing the court held that:
It seems to me to be an abuse of the process of the criminal law to use the
- purely formal charge of a trifling offence upon which there is no real
intention to proceed, as a cover for putting the person charged under arrest,
and obtaining from that person incriminating statements, not in relation
to the charge laid and made the subject of a caution, but in relation to a
more serious and altogether different offence: R. v. Seabrooke, [1932],
4 D.L.R. 116 at pp. 119-120. . . . It is trifling with the long-established
maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare, and has more than the mere ap-
pearance-but, in the intended result it has at times the effect-of a trial
by the police in camera before even the charge has been laid. Id. at 225.
39. The in personam jurisdiction of the courts in these cases is not questioned,
for it is recognized that jurisdiction in a criminal case is not impaired even
though the accused is brought before the court in an unlawful manner. Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8 (1926);
Sheehan v. Huff, 142 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1944). It is also admitted that a court
of criminal jurisdiction is not required to inquire as to how the prisoner came
within reach of its mandates. The presence of the accused in court on a proper
charge is sufficient to confer jurisdiction of his person even though he was
arrested contrary to law. Frye v. Settle, 168 F. Supp. 7, 11 (W.D. Mo. 1958);
Davenport v. District of Columbia, 61 A.2d 486 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1948).
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arrest is ignored or at least not questioned. To state that the courts as-
sume all vagrancy arrests are for the purpose of convicting and
punishing vagrants as such would be to impute to our judiciary an
unrealistic na'vet.
The 1907 California case of People v. Craig'4 0 presents the typical
fact situation in which resort is made to a vagrancy charge to legiti-
mize an arrest. But the case is extraordinary in that the court ad-
verts to the problem. The uncontradicted testimony of police officers
revealed that the true motive for the vagrancy arrest was a report
that the defendants had committed an assault, not the fact that they
were vagrants. The officers further explained that they had been
instructed not to bother the defendants, known vagrants, as long as
they conducted themselves properly in all other ways. But after the
assault, the officers, suspecting the defendants, arrested them on a
vagrancy charge. The court, commenting on this testimony, said,
whether this is an entirely commendable attitude towards the
appellants' class of misdemeanants, we need not stop to consider;
but we think that the admitted fact that the appellant would not
have been arrested if he had confined himself to vagrancy did
not render his arrest for that offense illegal.41
A careful reading of appellate court opinions of cases in which a
charge of vagrancy was involved at some stage of the pre-trial
proceedings is an eye-opening experience as to the expansion of the
application of vagrancy statutes. The mere fact that most of the
unfortunate parties involved in these proceedings are usually near
insolvency, and thus have no means with which to appeal their con-
viction,-2 would seem to justify the conclusion that hundreds of this
type arrest are made annually. Other reasons for the paucity of
cases at the appellate level are: the accused may be guilty of vagrancy
and fear that if too much attention is directed to him, he will be
identified as having committed a more serious offense ;43 he may be a
wanted criminal who elects to serve the shorter term, although in-
nocent of vagrancy ;44 or he may be innocent of vagrancy, but una-
ware (or perhaps aware) of the strength of the prosecution's case
against him for a more serious offense, and therefore believes the
shorter sentence is a wise compromise.4 5
40. 152 Cal. 42, 91 Pac. 997 (1907). Defendants, suspected of assault and
battery, were arrested and charged with vagrancy. They attacked the arrest
on the grounds that it was illegal, that they were not suspected of having com-
mitted a felony and that the officers had no warrants.
41. Id. at 47, 91 Pac. at 1000.
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Even at the appellate level, however, courts are almost always
oblivious to the extralegal applications of the vagrancy statute.40 In
the Washington case of State v. Grenz, 47 defendant, suspected of
chicken theft, was followed by police until he parked on a road near
a chicken farm. As he approached the wire fence, clad in "sneakers"
and carrying a flashlight and two gunny sacks, he was arrested for
vagrancy.48 The court admitted there was insufficient evidence to
support a charge of attempted larceny or burglary, because of lack
of an overt act tending to accomplish either offense, but held that the
charge was vagrancy and the arrest was consistent with the purpose
of the vagrancy act.
What the court apparently meant was that vagrancy laws are
designed to subject persons with objectionable antisocial habits to
police regulations which promote the general welfare. This, however,
should not provide the police with a license to resort to these laws as
a mere cover for an arrest which would otherwise be illegal. The
vagrancy statute was not designed to provide a source of reserve
legality. In the Grenz case, however, the court permitted the statute
to be used for just such a purpose. The court admitted that an
arrest for attempt, under the circumstances, would have been illegal ;4"
but then it immediately condoned another type of illegal arrest, ar-
rest on suspicion made technically legal by a vagrancy charge. 0 This
case provides a glaring example of the enduring harm that lies in an
evasion of judicial duty.5 '
46. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 243 Wis. 57, 63, 9 N.W.2d 68, 72 (1943), discussed
in text accompanying note 36 supra.
47. 26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P.2d 633 (1946).
48. Every person who wanders about the streets at late or unusual hours
without any visible or lawful business is a vagrant. Wash. Rev. Stat. § 2688.8
(1932).
49. State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d 764, 722, 175 P.2d 633, 638 (1946). The
dissent categorizes this crime as "an attempt to attempt to commit a crime."
50. Though vagrancy is the usual charge used to justify an arrest which
would otherwise be illegal, it is by no means the only means so employed. In
Fulford v. O'Conner, 3 Ill. 2d 490, 121 N.E.2d 767 (1954), an ex-convict, sus-
pected of robbery, was arrested at his place of employment and charged with
disorderly conduct. Police who testified at the trial admitted: "there had never
been any disorderly conduct, but this is a technical charge.
We bring a man in as a burglary suspect and we cannot prove it. We bring
him to court on what we call disorderly." The court, in ruling that this arrest
was illegal, and, regarding the police testimony, that rather than justifying the
detention, such testimony manifested a patent disregard of the duty which the
law imposes upon police officers. Continuing, the court said that the existence
of insufficient evidence to justify preferring charges against a criminal suspect
was no excuse for detention on some minor charge, but that such detention is
precisely the evil which the law is aimed at correcting.
51. Ex parte Lonardo, 86 Ohio App. 289, 293, 89 N.E.2d 502, 504 (1949).
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The dangers to which an extension of the application of vagrancy
laws beyond their intended scope may lead is also vividly illustrated
in the case of Edelman v. California.5 2 Defendant had been making
speeches in a public park, and in the course of these talks attacked
the local police force. The police silenced their critic by arresting
and charging him with vagrancy because he was dissolute.5 3 The
convicted speaker petitioned the United States Supreme Court to
grant certiorari, claiming a violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment because the statute was vague, indefinite
and uncertain.
The Court granted certiorari, but after further consideration con-
cluded that the writ had been improvidently granted. Justices Black
and Douglas, dissenting, were concerned with the petitioner's right
to freedom of speech. Justice Black admonished that the "courts
should be astute to examine and strike down dragnet legislation used
to abridge public discussion of views on political, social or economic
questions." 5' He stated that the statute was void on its face, for it
permitted punishment for incidents fairly within the protection of
the guarantee of free speech.
CONCLUSION
Although the expansion and extension of the vagrancy laws by law
enforcement agencies are seldom adverted to by the courts, the
scholars are many and unanimous in denouncing these practices.
At the outset, all concede that the comprehensive definition of va-
grancy provides an effective means of combatting the criminal ele-
ments of the populace and temporarily restrains them,55 and in this
respect the statute is utilized to effect the historic purpose of the
vagrancy laws as a method of preventing crime 6 The extensive scope
of the law and the quick,57 non-publicized summary convictions truly
52. 344 U.S. 357 (1953).
58. Cal. Pen. Code § 647 (5). "Every dissolute person... is a vagrant...
54. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 366 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
55. Freund, The Police Power § 100 (1904); Note, 16 St. Louis L. Rev. 148
(1981). See State v. Grenz, 26 Wash. 2d 764, 175 P.2d 633, (1946).
56. Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv. L.
Rev. 1203 (1953); see State v. Grenz, supra note 55.
57. Douglas, in his article, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 Yale L.J. 1
(1960), pointed out that according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime
Reports, in:
1958, out of 2,340,000 arrests, 88,351 were for vagrancy;
1957, out of 2,068,667 arrests, 69,520 were for vagrancy;
1956, out of 2,070,794 arrests, 75,478 were for vagrancy.
Douglas said that the speed with which these arrests are handled is amazing.
Fifty to sixty defendants were processed by one judge in 15 minutes and one
court handled 1,600 cases in a month.
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provide the police with a "most effective weapon in the arsenal of
law enforcement."""
However, "preventive arrests" and "precautionary arrests," the
means used to effect a legitimate end, are uniformly condemned as
being unwarranted under our laws, 59 and it is this aspect of the law
that is feared. "The power of the prosecution to use laws passed for
one purpose to accomplish an entirely different purpose is to be viewed
with alarm."60
That the courts continue to avoid discussion of the misapplications
of vagrancy laws, thereby condoning the abuses of the police, can
only be justified by a balancing of interests-weighing the intrusion
into personal liberties against the demand for effective law enforce-
ment-and concluding the latter outweighs the former.01 But it is
contended that such a result can only be reached on unbalanced
scales. To permit police powers to outweigh the liberties guaranteed
by the Bill of Rights, and extended by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, is to impose a serious threat to the preserva-
tion of basic human rights.62 The justifiability and lawfulness of the
end sought by an expansion of the application of vagrancy laws is not
questioned. Nevertheless, to permit the vagrancy law to be utilized
for purposes other than its enactment, to condone its use as a tool
of crime discovery rather than as a tool of crime prevention, is to
58. Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 Hastings L.J. 237, 252-53 (1958).
59. See, e.g., Note, supra note 55; Freund, supra note 55.
60. Arnold, Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 Yale
L.J. 1, 14 (1932).
61. Such a conclusion tends to destroy constitutional safeguards established
at the infancy of our nation in the interests of its citizens. However, it must be
recognized that a contrary holding might substantially hinder police efficiency.
Nevertheless, this problem must be raised.
Courts are never able to live up to the stanards set for them by legal
scholars .... Yet it seems to be the general opinion that we should keep on
criticising courts in the light of these unattainable ideals. Arnold, supra
note 60 at 1.
62. The inherent danger in the nature of vagrancy statutes was recognized
as early as 1860 in Forbes' Case, 11 Abb. Pr. 52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860), where
Sutherland, J., speaking of vagrancy statutes, said:
They are constitutional, but should be construed strictly, and executed care-
fully in favor of the liberty of the citizen. Their description of persons
who shall be deemed vagrants, is necessarily vague and uncertain, giving to
the magistrate in their execution an almost unchecked opportunity for
arbitrary oppression or careless cruelty. The main object or purpose of the
statutes should be kept constantly in view, and the magistrate should be
careful and see, before convicting, that the person charged with being a
vagrant is shown either by his or her confession, or by competent testimony,
to come exactly within the description of one of the statutes. Id. at 55.
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permit law enforcement agencies to become law breakers, and breeds
lawlessness and disrespect of authority.63
63. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
488 (1925), said:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if
if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent,
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration
of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Govern-
ment may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Id. at 485.
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